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FEDERAL PRoCBDURB-RBMoVAL JurusmcnoN-JurusmcnoNAL EsroPPEL

-Respondent sued petitioner, a Florida corporation, the Indiana Lumbermen's
Mutual Insurance Company, an Indiana corporation, and Joe Reiss, a citizen of
Texas, in a Texas state court. The complaint asked for relief in the alternative
for a fire loss suffered by respondent On the joint petition of the two corporate
defendants, the case was removed to the federal court under section 144l(c) of
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the United States Judicial Code.1 Respondent unsuccessfully moved to remand
the case, and, after trial of the case to a jury, a judgment in favor of the respondent was awarded against the petitioner alone. Petitioner's motion to vacate judgment was denied, and this action was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals.
On writ of certiorari, held, reversed. The majority of the Court concluded that
there was no right under the code to remove the case because of the absence of
"separate and independent claims or causes of action,"2 and this being a jurisdictional requirement, the petitioner was not estopped to allege this jurisdictional
defect. The dissenting Justices argued that any error in removal which might
have occurred was merely an irregularity and petitioner should be estopped from
making any protest as to jurisdiction. American Fire and Casualty Co. v. Finn,
341 U.S. 6, 71 S.Ct. 534 (1951).
The denial of a motion to remand is not considered an order which will support an interlocutory appeal, but when the issue of removability is coupled with
an appealable order or decree, then the lower. court's action will be reviewed,
since the jurisdiction of the court is in dispute. 3 It is well established that the
consent of the litigants will not give a court jurisdiction of a case if it does not
have power to deal with the subject matter of the dispute.4 However, even
though removal is improper and the courts do not obtain jurisdiction in that manner, the courts have consistently held that if they would otherwise have original
jurisdiction to hear the case, then the error in removal will be considered as a
mere irregularity and the judgment will not be disturbed. 5 The dispute between
the majority and the dissent in the principal case was in regard to the question of
whether the federal court would have had original jurisdiction of the case. The
majority answered in the negative, looking at the case from the trial level. It
found that the complaint had a citizen of Texas as plaintiff and defendant; and
further, it pointed to the fact that the judgment adjudicated the merits of the
claim against the resident defendant by decreeing that he was free from liability.6
The dissent considered the judgment on appeal to be the controlling factor in determining the original jurisdiction of the court. It found, therefore, that the
dispute between the petitioner and the respondent satisfied federal diversity
128 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1951) §1441.
2'fhis aspect of the principal case is noted in 49 MicH. L. REv. 1236 (1951).
3 Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 61 S.Ct. 229 (1940); MayHower Industries v. Thor Corp., (3d Cir. 1950) 184 F. (2d) 537.
4Mans6.eld C. & L.M.R. Co. v. Swan, Ill U.S. 379, 4 S.Ct. 510 (1884); Tillman
v. Russo Asiatic Bank, (2d Cir. 1931) 51 F. (2d) 1023; Wabash R. Co. v. Barbour, (6th
Cir. 1896) 73 F. 513; Capron v. Van Noorden, 2 Cranch (6 U.S.) 125 (1804).
5Baggs v. Martin, 179 U.S. 206, 21 S.Ct. 109 (1900); Toledo, St. L. & W.R. Co.
v. Perenchio, (7th Cir. 1913) 205 F. 472; Handley-Mack v. Godchaux Sugar Co., (6th
Cir. 1924) 2 F. (2d) 435; Bailey v. Texas Co., (2d Cir. 1931) 47 F. (2d) 153; Carpenter
v. Baltimore and Ohio Ry., (6th Cir. 1940) 109 F. (2d) 375.
6 The trial court's judgment provided, "It Is Further Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed
that the Plaintiff take nothing as against Defendants, Indiana Lurnbermen's Mutual Insurance Company and Joe Reiss, individually and doing business as the Joe Reiss Insurance
Agency, and that such Defendants go hence without day with their costs." Principal case
at 17.
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jurisdiction requirements. Although, as pointed out by the majority opinion,7
the jurisdiction of the federal court should not be expanded by judicial action,
it is questionable whether the result of the principal case has not gone too far.
The respondent, after being remanded to the state court, may sue the petitioner
individually in the federal court. This will mean that substantially the same
questions will be litigated for the second time between the parties. It is submitted that the dissent is correct in calling the error merely procedural and refusing to allow petitioner, who initiated the removal to the federal court, to
protest the resulting federal judgment.8 In any event, the decision by the majority of the court suggests the advisability of allowing an interlocutory appeal on
the trial court's action to remand. Such an appeal in this case would have prevented the expense and delay caused by delaying the appeal until the merits of
the case had been litigated.
Paul M. D. Harrison, S. Ed.

7 Principal
8 Professor

case at 17.
Moore, in analyzing the new Judicial Code, asserts that the former removal
provisions were keyed to original jurisdiction, while the new provisions are not so related
in all respects. H this is correct, then, under the former provisions, original jurisdiction
which would allow retention of jurisdiction regardless of removal errors would be more
easily found. This may serve to give the dissent further support in liberalizing the approach
to original jurisdiction by looking at the judgment which is on appeal. See MooRE, CoMMENTARY ON THE U.S. JUDICIAL CoDB 240 et seq. (1949).

